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Table 3 Fertility preferences (Net Desire), child mortality and women’s BP in Ghana

From: Childhood mortality, intra-household bargaining power and fertility preferences among women in Ghana

 

Child mortality risk

Child mortality (Dummy)

Child mortality rate

Model 1

Model 2

Model 1

Model 2

Model 1

Model 2

CM (Risk, Dummy, rate)

0.751***

0.779***

0.563***

0.589***

2.072***

2.118***

(0.222)

(0.225)

(0.077)

(0.080)

(0.277)

(0.293)

WBP (Index)

−0.054***

− 0.010

− 0.063***

− 0.047**

− 0.062***

− 0.056**

(0.021)

(0.042)

(0.021)

(0.023)

(0.021)

(0.023)

Index*CM

 

−0.176

 

− 0.078

 

− 0.144

 

(0.151)

 

(0.052)

 

(0.191)

Urban location

0.021

0.021

−0.015

−0.018

− 0.014

− 0.015

(0.070)

(0.070)

(0.072)

(0.072)

(0.071)

(0.071)

Age

−0.016**

− 0.016**

− 0.017***

− 0.018***

− 0.018***

− 0.018***

(0.006)

(0.006)

(0.007)

(0.007)

(0.007)

(0.007)

Woman’s education

 Primary

−0.016

− 0.012

− 0.003

0.003

− 0.003

− 0.001

(0.093)

(0.093)

(0.094)

(0.094)

(0.094)

(0.094)

 Secondary

−0.140

− 0.138

− 0.134

−0.132

− 0.134

−0.132

(0.086)

(0.086)

(0.086)

(0.086)

(0.086)

(0.086)

 Higher

−0.336**

− 0.340**

− 0.374**

− 0.372**

−0.371**

− 0.370**

(0.155)

(0.155)

(0.159)

(0.159)

(0.160)

(0.160)

Husband’s education

 Primary

−0.095

− 0.090

− 0.075

− 0.073

−0.085

− 0.084

(0.107)

(0.108)

(0.106)

(0.106)

(0.106)

(0.106)

 Secondary

−0.079

− 0.075

− 0.054

− 0.051

− 0.067

−0.066

(0.088)

(0.088)

(0.088)

(0.088)

(0.088)

(0.088)

 Higher

−0.183

− 0.181

− 0.172

− 0.173

−0.192

− 0.194

(0.118)

(0.118)

(0.119)

(0.118)

(0.119)

(0.119)

Household Wealth status

 Poor

−0.042

− 0.038

− 0.071

− 0.066

−0.076

− 0.074

(0.088)

(0.088)

(0.089)

(0.089)

(0.088)

(0.088)

 Middle

−0.170*

− 0.167*

− 0.225**

− 0.221**

−0.219**

− 0.218**

(0.097)

(0.097)

(0.098)

(0.098)

(0.097)

(0.097)

 Rich

−0.254**

−0.248**

− 0.309***

−0.305***

− 0.308***

−0.305***

(0.112)

(0.112)

(0.113)

(0.113)

(0.113)

(0.113)

 Richest

−0.019

−0.018

−0.090

− 0.085

−0.092

− 0.090

(0.132)

(0.132)

(0.133)

(0.133)

(0.132)

(0.132)

Husband’s preference

−0.052

− 0.057

−0.060

− 0.064

−0.055

− 0.057

(0.061)

(0.061)

(0.062)

(0.062)

(0.062)

(0.062)

Number of children

−0.152***

−0.152***

− 0.179***

−0.180***

− 0.167***

−0.167***

(0.015)

(0.015)

(0.017)

(0.017)

(0.017)

(0.017)

NHIS coverage

−0.058

−0.060

−0.051

− 0.049

−0.051

− 0.050

(0.060)

(0.060)

(0.061)

(0.061)

(0.061)

(0.061)

Husband’s age

0.003

0.003

0.003

0.003

0.003

0.003

(0.005)

(0.005)

(0.005)

(0.005)

(0.005)

(0.005)

Self employed

−0.060

−0.058

−0.042

− 0.039

−0.045

− 0.044

(0.073)

(0.074)

(0.075)

(0.075)

(0.076)

(0.076)

Polygamous husband

0.135*

0.135*

0.136*

0.133*

0.133*

0.132*

(0.079)

(0.079)

(0.080)

(0.080)

(0.080)

(0.080)

Constant

2.257***

2.246***

2.464***

2.452***

2.453***

2.447***

(0.180)

(0.181)

(0.171)

(0.171)

(0.173)

(0.172)

Pseudo R2

0.078

0.078

0.083

0.084

0.086

0.086

N

3600

3600

3398

3398

3398

3398

  1. Source: Authors estimation
  2. Model 2 includes interaction term
  3. Robust standard errors in parentheses
  4. WBP Women’s Bargaining Power
  5. * p < 0.1 ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01