Skip to main content

Table 4 Fertility preferences (Extra fertility), child mortality a in Ghana

From: Childhood mortality, intra-household bargaining power and fertility preferences among women in Ghana

 

Child mortality risk

Child mortality (Dummy)

Child mortality rate

Model 1

Model 2

Model 1

Model 2

Model 1

Model 2

CM (Risk, Dummy, rate)

1.236***

1.231***

0.539***

0.547***

1.732***

1.802***

(0.201)

(0.201)

(0.065)

(0.066)

(0.220)

(0.219)

WBP (Index)

−0.073***

− 0.029

− 0.084***

− 0.068***

− 0.086***

− 0.073***

(0.018)

(0.037)

(0.018)

(0.021)

(0.018)

(0.020)

Index*CM

−0.176

− 0.074*

− 0.235

(0.127)

(0.040)

(0.146)

Urban location

0.055

0.053

−0.018

− 0.022

− 0.016

−0.019

(0.066)

(0.066)

(0.068)

(0.068)

(0.068)

(0.068)

Age

−0.027***

− 0.027***

− 0.029***

− 0.030***

− 0.030***

−0.030***

(0.006)

(0.006)

(0.006)

(0.006)

(0.006)

(0.006)

Woman’s education

 Primary

−0.157**

−0.154**

− 0.150*

− 0.150*

− 0.152*

− 0.154*

(0.077)

(0.077)

(0.079)

(0.080)

(0.079)

(0.080)

 Secondary

−0.331***

− 0.329***

− 0.328***

− 0.328***

− 0.325***

− 0.324***

(0.073)

(0.073)

(0.075)

(0.075)

(0.075)

(0.076)

 Higher

−0.746***

−0.749***

− 0.733***

− 0.731***

− 0.730***

− 0.726***

(0.150)

(0.150)

(0.157)

(0.158)

(0.158)

(0.158)

Husband’s education

 Primary

− 0.165*

− 0.160*

− 0.204**

− 0.201**

− 0.212**

− 0.210**

(0.088)

(0.088)

(0.090)

(0.090)

(0.090)

(0.090)

 Secondary

−0.441***

− 0.437***

− 0.432***

− 0.429***

− 0.446***

− 0.444***

(0.076)

(0.076)

(0.078)

(0.078)

(0.078)

(0.078)

 Higher

−0.470***

− 0.468***

− 0.444***

− 0.445***

− 0.467***

−0.468***

(0.109)

(0.109)

(0.113)

(0.113)

(0.114)

(0.114)

Household Wealth status

 Poor

−0.129*

−0.124

−0.197**

− 0.191**

− 0.195**

− 0.191**

(0.076)

(0.076)

(0.077)

(0.078)

(0.077)

(0.077)

 Middle

−0.115

− 0.112

− 0.210**

−0.205**

− 0.206**

−0.202**

(0.086)

(0.086)

(0.088)

(0.088)

(0.088)

(0.089)

 Rich

−0.337***

−0.331***

− 0.446***

−0.443***

− 0.446***

−0.444***

(0.102)

(0.103)

(0.105)

(0.105)

(0.105)

(0.105)

 Richest

−0.345***

−0.341***

− 0.434***

−0.427***

− 0.441***

−0.437***

(0.116)

(0.116)

(0.119)

(0.119)

(0.120)

(0.120)

 Husband’s preference

−0.088

−0.094*

− 0.079

−0.085

− 0.077

−0.082

(0.056)

(0.056)

(0.057)

(0.057)

(0.057)

(0.057)

 Number of children

−0.211***

−0.211***

− 0.268***

−0.270***

− 0.248***

−0.251***

(0.017)

(0.017)

(0.019)

(0.019)

(0.019)

(0.019)

 NHIS coverage

0.132**

0.129**

0.110**

0.109**

0.114**

0.113**

(0.054)

(0.054)

(0.056)

(0.056)

(0.056)

(0.056)

 Husband’s age

−0.007*

−0.007*

−0.006

−0.006

− 0.006

−0.006

(0.004)

(0.004)

(0.004)

(0.004)

(0.004)

(0.004)

 Self employed

0.137**

0.139**

0.127*

0.131**

0.121*

0.125*

(0.063)

(0.063)

(0.066)

(0.066)

(0.066)

(0.066)

 Polygamous husband

0.077

0.077

0.084

0.085

0.084

0.085

(0.069)

(0.069)

(0.071)

(0.071)

(0.071)

(0.071)

 Constant

2.054***

2.054***

2.624***

2.620***

2.609***

2.606***

(0.168)

(0.168)

(0.163)

(0.163)

(0.163)

(0.163)

Pseudo R2

0.187

0.187

0.199

0.199

0.204

0.205

N

3255

3255

3072

3072

3072

3072

  1. Source: Authors estimation
  2. Model 2 includes interaction term
  3. Robust standard errors in parentheses
  4. WBP Women’s Bargaining Power
  5. * p < 0.1 ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01